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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
S ince  th'e beginnings of t r i a l  by j u r y  t h e  law has t r i e d  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  
way i n  which j u r i e s  dec ide  cases .  I n  e a r l i e s t  t imes  t h e  c o n t r o l  was occasion- 
a l l y  d i r e c t  and b l u n t ,  a s  i n  t h e  Throckmorton c a s e ,  1 S t .  Tr .  869 (1554) 
where a  j u r y  which a c q u i t t e d  a  man accused of t r e a s o n  was committed t o  p r i -  
son f o r  t h e i r  v e r d i c t .  (See Chambliss & Seidman, 1971: 420.) The pass ing  
of such h a r s h  procedures  does no t  i n d i c a t e  a  l e s sen ing  of t h e  d i squ ie tude  
w i t h  which much of t h e  l e g a l  profess ion  has  viewed t r i a l  by ju ry .  
One a r e a  of repea ted  concern has been t h a t  j u r i e s  t ake  t h e  law i n t o  t h e i r  
own hands and dec ide  cases  according t o  what they  t h i n k  t h e  law should be, 
r a t h e r  than according t o  t h e  judge 's  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  1 
A r e l a t e d  i s s u e  i s  t h e  degree t o  which j u r i e s  employ l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v e n t  
evidence i n  a r r i v i n g  a t  v e r d i c t s .  Such evidence inc ludes  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of 
insurance  i n  t o r t  c a s e s  (Keeton & O'Connell 1965: 32,  73) and pe r sona l  a t t r i -  
b u t e s  of defendants  and/or  v i c t i m s  ( p l a i n t i f f s  i n  c i v i l  ca ses )  (Broeder,  
1965: 131) .  
U n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  however, t h e r e  has been very  l i t t l e  empi r i ca l  evidence 
a s  t o  how j u r i e s  do dec ide  cases .  I n  t h e  l a s t  t e n  yea r s  a  growing body of 
exper imenta l  and survey d a t a  has  begun t o  add res s  t h e s e  ques t ions .  
A main branch of t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  has  been done by psycho log i s t s  and 
s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s  u s u a l l y  under t h e  banner of what has  come t o  be  c a l l e d  
a t t r i b u t i o n  theory  (Heider,  1959; Jones ,  e t . a l . ,  1971-2; Kel ly ,  1967).  Thei r  
main method of i n q u i r y  has  been t h e  l a b o r a t o r y  experiment.  
The experiments done i n  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  such t h i n g s  
a s  v i c t i m  and defendant  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  (Landy & Aronson, 1969; Ef ran ,  1974; 
. . 
S i g a l l  & Ostrove,  1975),  defendant  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974, 
Nemeth & Sos i s  1973),  a t t i t u d e s  (Mi t che l l  & Byrne, 1972 and 1973),  sex  of 
j u r o r  (Stephan, 1974) and s t a t u s  (Thibaut & Rieken, 1955) a f f e c t  d e c i s i o n s  
as t o  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  It is  wi th  t h i s  experimental  t r a d i t i o n  t h a t ;  we are 
p r imar i ly  concerned.. , . . . . .  . . . . . :  . . . . . .  . ., . . .  . .  . . a  . . . % . , 
One way co summarize.the experimental  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  t o  s ay  t h a t  i t  has  
pursued t h e  l e g a l  r e a l i s ' t  l i n e  of looking f o r  ways i n  which t h e  law i n  a c t i o n  . < 
I I 
d e v i a t e s  f r o m , t h e  law on t h e  books. The r e s u l t s  t hus  f a r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  
is va r i ance .  The conclus ion  o f t e n  drawn from t h i s  work is  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a . , 
s i g n i f i c a n t  u se  of what would appear t o  be l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  i n  
t h e  j u r y  decision-making process .  The d a t a ,  however, a r e  no t  un ta in t ed .  
There a r e  both methodological  and conceptua l  problems w i t h  much of t h e  r e -  
s ea rch  which may have inf luenced  t h e  r e s u l t s , o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  and/or  t h e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  one may p l a c e  on these  r e su l t s , .  ,This paper add res ses  t h e  con- 
c e p t u a l  i s s u e s .  
2 
Conceptual I s s u e s  
. , . . . . . . .  . , .  . I .  . . . ,  . . , . , .  ~ '.. : . . . . .  
I n  - The mer rid an 'jury, ~ a l v e n  and' i e i s e l  'found t h a t  - i n  19 .1  c e n t  of 
. < 
' t h e  c a s e s  (N=3.380) ,  t h e  judge and j u r y  d'isagr'eed3 a s  t o  t h e  p r o p e r  v e r d i c t .  
I n  c a s e s  where t h e r e  was a disagreement t h e  r e s e a r c h e r s  asked t h e  t r i a l  
judge why the& had been a disagreement.  According t o  t h e  judges,  a l a r g e  
pe rcen t  of t h e s e  disagreements  were due t o  "ju& sent iments  abou't t h e  hefen-  
. . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . ' . .  I .  
dan t  and j u r y  sen t imdn t i  a b o t t  t h e  law." 
. . .  . . , , . , .  . . . . .  . . f .  i. . .> ' 
J U ~ ~  u s e  of t o r t  concepts  such a s  c o * t r i b ~ t o r y  'negl igence  i n  dec id ing  
. . - .  * .  . . . . , . . .  . _ / I .  . ' . .  . . . .  .. . . .  . , - 
c r i m i n a l  &ses  i s  an  example o f '  "sent iment  i b d ~ t  h e  law.'' For example, i n  
. . . .  
. . . . . , . . . . 
one case  ' fhe ' .defendant  and t h e  v i c t i m  had been ;laying' "chicken," t h a t  i s  
t e s t i n g  each o t h e r ' s  nerves  by d r i v i n g  r e c k l e s s l y .  The judge ' s  exp lana t ion  
. . -  
f o r  the j u r y  a c q u i t t a l  was : 
t h e  j u r y  d i d # n o t  ' fo l low t h e  charge of t h e  c o u r t ,  they  
I 
saw some evidence of con t r ibu to ry  negl igence  on t h e  p a r t  
of t h e  person a s s a u l t e d .  Cont r ibutory  negl igence  i s  no 
defense  i n  t h e  laws of t h i s  s t a t e  t o  c r imina l  ac t ions . .  (1966: 243) 
a 8 
An example of sen t iments  about. defendant  o r  v i c t i m  i s  a judge ' s  remark i n  . - 
a rape  case :  
A group of young people on a  beer  d r ink ing  p a r t y .  The j u r y  probably 
f igu red  t h e  g i r l  asked f o r  what she  got  ... (1966:250) 
While both examples a r e  occas ions  of judge-jury disagreements ,  i t  is  impor- 
t a n t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between them. 
To put  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  more a b s t r a c t  terms,  i t  is u s e f u l  t o  c a l l  upon H. 
L.A. H a r t ' s  pe r spec t ive  t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  a d e f e a s i b l e  concept (Hart ,  1949; 
1968).  That is,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is  an  accusa t ion  t h a t  'a person i s  connected t o  an 
untoward even t ,  and t h e  accused i s  c a l l e d  t o  account f o r  h i s  behavior  by p re sen t ing  
a n  adequate  excuse. The k inds  of excuses which a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  depend upon t h e  
4 
n a t u r e  of t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e .  C e r t a i n  types  of excuses a r e  no t  app ropr i a t e  -
f o r  c e r t a i n  types  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  rules . .  For i n s t ance ; in  negl igence  cases ,  where 
t h e  i s s u e  i s  p r i m a r i l y  whether a  person behaved a s  a  reasonable  man, a n  excuse t h a t  
one d i d  no t  i n t e n d  t h e  consequence i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  According t o  t h e  l e g a l  
d e f i n i t i o n  of negl igence ,  such an excuse should be r e j e c t e d  no ma t t e r  .how convinced 
t h e  a d j u d i c a t o r  i s  t h a t  i t  is  f a c t u a l l y  t r u e .  O r ,  i n  the "chicken" d r i v e r  example 
above, t h e  de fendan t ' s  g u i l t  o r  innocence should no t  b e  cont ingent  upon t h e  care-  
l e s s n e s s  of h i s  v i c t im .  
Given a  p a r t i c u l a r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e ,  t h e r e  i s ' s t i l l  t h e  f u r t h e r  ques t ion  
a s  t o  whether undersuch  a r u l e  t h e  defendant has  an  excuse which exculpa tes  o r  
m i t i g a t e s  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  A t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  two important  i s s u e s  are: a)  what 
evidence t h e  ad jud ica to r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  cons ider  i n  assess i ,ng  t h e  adequacy of t h e  
excuse,  and b) t h e  probat iveness  of t h e  evidence considered.  I n  t h e  r ape  case ,  t h e  
only  disagreement between t h e  jydge and j u r y  may be  whether going t o  a  p a r t y  is  
p roba t ive  a s  t o  whether t h e  g i r l  r e a l l y  r e s i s t e d .  I n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  c e r t a i n  
evidence may seem s o  i r r e l e v a n t  t h a t  t h e  a d j u d i c a t o r  does n o t  wish t o  cons ider  
i t  a t  a l l .  I n  many c a s e s ,  t h e  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  evidence is  a f a c t u a l  
ques t ion  about .which disagreement may a r i s e .  'The d e f i n i t i o n  of a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
r u l e ,  however, i s  a n  i s s u e  of a  d i f f e r e n t  o rde r .  Given d i f f e r e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
r u l e s ,  whole types  of evidence may become r e l e v a n t  o r  i r r e l e v a n t .  
Most of t h e  experimental  l i t e r a t u r e  does not  make t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  The 
The t y p i c a l  j u ry  experiment compares v a r i a t i o n  on some experimental  v a r i a b l e  
such as v i c t i m  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  wi th  the  frequency of g u i l t y  v e r d i c t  o r ,  g iven  t h e  
g u i l t  of t h e  defendant ,  t h e  amount of punishment t o  which he should be  sub jec t ed .  
The r e s u l t s  of most of t h e  experiments a r e  t h a t  t h e s e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
On t h i s  b a s i s ,  t h e  conclus ion  is  reached t h a t  j u r i e s  a r e  t o  some degree  i r r a -  
t i o n a l .  (See Landy & Aronson, 1969: 151; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974: 498.) 
There a r e  two problems wi th  t h i s  a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t ,  i n  some experiments  
t h e  j u r o r s  a r e  presented  wi th  l i t t l e  evidence beyond t h e  independent v a r i a b l e ,  5 
It i s  unclear  whether such evidence would assume t h e  same importance i n  s i t u a t i o n s  
where more p roba t ive  evidence i s  a v a i l a b l e .  
f 
The second problem i s  t h a t ,  because t h e  i s s u e  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  i s  
never  r a i s e d ,  i t  is imposs ib le  t o  know how j u r o r s  a r e  us ing  o r  misusing information.  
There a r e  two ways i n  which j u r o r s  might misuse informat ion ,  such a s  defendant  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s .  On t h e  one hand they  may be mistaken as t o  i t s  p roba t iveness ,  
bu t ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  u s e  i t  wi th in  t h e  context  of t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, they  may s e t  up such information a s  a c l e a r l y  independent ground of 
dec i s ion .  By and l a r g e ,  - t h e , e x p e r i m e n t a l i s t s  have ignored t h e  f i r s t  p o s s i b i l i t y .  
Th i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  imp l i e s  g r e a t e r  j u r y  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  than may i n  f a c t  e x i s t .  
For example, i n  t h e  experiment repor ted  below, one j u r o r  dur ing  t h e  d e l i b e r a -  
t i o n s  made t h e  fo l lowing  comment. "Well. . .I t h i n k  t h a t  i f  he had wanted t o  s t e a l  
t hose  d e l i b e r a t e l y  he would have gone about i t  i n  a much more s e c r e t i v e  way. I n  
t h e  middle of t h e  n i g h t .  . .o r  t o  d i s g u i s e  h i s  person." The ques t ion  t h e  j u r o r  was 
w r e s t l i n g  wi th  w a s  whecher t h e  defendant  intended t o  t a k e  some b r i c k s .  She may be 
wrong about  t h e  p roba t iveness  of t h e  evidence. Perhaps most t h i e v e s  commit t h e i r  
cr imes i n  broad d a y l i g h t ,  t h ink ing  no one w i l l  pay a t t e n t i o n .  She was, however 
apply ing  t h i s  evidence i n  accordance wi th  t h e  j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  about  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  t h a t  should govern t h e  case .  
P a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  conceptua l  d i s t i n c t i o n  made above, t h e r e  are two types  of 
j u d i i i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  l a w : . a )  The judge may i n s t r u c t  t h e  j u r y  as t o  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  they should employ i n  dec id ing  t h e  c a s e  o r  b)  may i n s t r u c t  
t h e  j u r y  a s  t o  t h e  r e l evance  o r  i r r e l e v a n c e  of c e r t a i n  evidence given a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
r u l e .  The p re sen t  s tudy  focuses  upon t h e  f i r s t  type  of i n s t r u c t i o n .  
-- - -- 
The Experiment 
The experiment repor ted  here is  based upon a. cr iminal  case  :loosely based 
on t h e  f a c t s  and l e g a l  i s s u e s  of Morisse t te  v .  United S t a t e s ,  3&2 U.S. 246, 
96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S. C t .  240 (1952). Br ie f ly ,  t h e  case  involves t h e  na ture  
of t h e  i n t e n t i o n  an ind iv idua l  must have t o  be  g u i l t y  of t h e  f e d e r a l  crime 
of conversion of government p roper ty , l8  USC Sec. 641. Mor i s se t t e ' t ook  $84 
worth of o ld  army dummy bombshell cas ings  from some land i n  nor thern  Michi- 
gan which t h e  A i r  Force  used a s  a p r a c t i c e  bombing range.   here was no ar -  
gument a s  t o  whether Mcr i s se t t e  took the  cas ings  and sold  them f o r  scrap.  
He d id  so  i n  broad day l igh t  and f r e e l y  admitted he had done so.  Morisse t te  
claimed, however, t h a t  h e  bel ieved the  cas ings  were abandoned property and, 
the re fo re ,  he d id  not  intend t o  s t e a l  t h e  cas ings .  
The t r i a l  judge refused t o  al low t h e  j u r y  t o  consider  t h i s  excuse, saying 
( i n  our terminology) t h a t  t h e  appropr ia te  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  only required 
t h a t  t h e  defendant have the  genera l  i n t e n t  t o  take .  He d id  no t  have t o  
possess t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  s t e a l .  This  p o s i t i o n  was upheld by t h e  
cour t  of appeals ,  but  t h e  Supreme Court,  per  J u s t i c e  Jackson, unan'imously 
reversed. 6 
A case  was devised which would incorpora te ,  among o the r  cons idera t ions ,  
t h e  i s s u e  of i n t e n t  r a i s e d  i n  Morisse t te  v. U.S. The f a c t s  of t h e  experi- 
mental case  a r e  t h a t  approximately 9 months a f t e r  a bui ld ing burned down 
on a p iece  of property on t h e  o u t s k i r t s  of a town, a r e t i r e d  c i t i z e n ,  named 
William Har r i s ,  who l i v e d  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  removed a l a r g e  p i l e  of uncleaned 
b r i c k s  and used some of them t o  bui ld  an outdoor barbecue. A s  t h e  a c t  of 
taking the  b r i c k s  occurred during the  af ternoon,  i t  was observed by a woman 
who l i v e d  ac ross  t h e  s t r e e t  from t h e  proper ty .  She recognized Har r i s  and 
reported t h e  event t o  t h e  p o l i c e  when they quest ioned he r  i n  t h e  course of 
t h e i r  inves t iga t ion  about t h e  missing b r i cks .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  Har r i s  was 
arrested and charged with the theft of the bricks. At the time of his arr- 
est, and throughout his testimony, Harris claimed that he thought that the 
bricks had been abandoned. I 
The trial was presented to the subjects by means of a videotape of a I 
courtroom procedure. Attempts were made to.assure the believability of 
the trial but the subjects were informed at the outset that it was staged 
and that certain aspects of an actual trial (for example, the attorney's 
opening and closing arguments) were omitted. 
The first part of the videotape consisted of the testimony(inc1uding 
some cross-examination testimony) of four witnesses. The testimony was 
identical for all versions of the experiment with the exception of the 
identity of the owner of the property. In half of the trials the owner 
of the property was the State of Michigan and a representative for the 
state presented testimony in the trial. In the remainder of the trials, 
the property was owned by a private individual and he testified. ,Through 
these manipulations, the facts of the case remained virtually unchanged 
while the "size" of the victim varied. 1 
After the presentation of the witnesses' testimony, 'the judge gave 
his instructions to the jury. Among these instructions, two additional ex- 
1 
7 perimental variables were introduced. 
I 
j 
One variable was the degree to which the jurors were expected to follow 
the judge's instructions. At the beginning of his instructions the judge 
either informed the jury that it was their duty to determine the facts 
(and to determine them only from the evidence in this case) and to decide ! ! 
the case by applying the law, -- as the judge stated it, to the facts. (Herein- .- 
after, this instruction is called Judge law.) Or the judge said that -
whatever he told them about the law,-while it was intended to be helpful to 
them in reaching a just and proper verdict in the case, was not binding upon 
the members of the jury, and they could accept the law as they apprehended 
it to be in the case. ( Hereinafter this instruction is called, Jury law.) 
At a later point in the instructions, the judge presented the definition 
of the intent necessary to find the defendant guilty. The alternatives 
of general or specific 'intent were defined, respectively, as: 
In determining the defendant's intention, the law assumes 
that every person intends the natural consequences of his 
voluntary acts. Therefore, the defendant's intention is 
inferred from his voluntary commission of the act for- 
bidden by law, and it is not necessary to establish that the -
defendant knew that his act was a violation of law. 
Or, the crime charged in this case requires proof of spe- -- 
cific intent before the defendant can be convicted. 
Specific intent means more than the general intent to 
commit the act. To establish specific intent the government 
must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which 
the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. 
Such intent may be deterniined from all the facts:.and..cir- 
cumstances surrounding the case. The word "knowj.nglyl' 
means that the act was done voluntarily and purposefully 
not because of mistake or accident. Knowledge may be 
proven by the defendant's conduct, and by all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case. No perpon can 
intentionally avoid knowledge by closing his eyes to facts 
which should prompt him to investigate. 
The experimental design can therefore be summarized as follows: 
General Intent Specific Intent 




sibility-rule. The dimension of judge law-jury law establishes whether, 
in general, the jury is bound by the set of responsibility rules presented 
by the judge. The intent variable defines explicitly one key element 
of the responsibility rule in this case. Finally, the state vs. individual 
Judge Law 
variable introduces one irrelevant factor which may prdduce variance in 
jury verdicts. This distinction has produced different assessments of 
Jury Law Judge Law Jury Law 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  among respondents  i n  a  l a r g e  s c a l e  a t t i t u d e  survey  (Smigel, 
1956).  
Sub jec t s  
The s u b j e c t s  were drawn from t h e  C i r c u i t  and D i s t r i c t  Cour ts  of Wash- 
tenaw County (Ann Arbor) .  These i n d i v i d u a l s  were a c t u a l  j u r o r s  who r e c e n t l y  
served f o r  a two-month pe r iod  i n  t h e s e  Courts ,  A p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  of about  
9  35% of a l l  e l i g i b l e  j u r o r s  was achieved.  Each exper imenta l  j u r y  c o n s i s t e d  
of f i v e  o r  s i x  members1' and each c e l l  of t h e  exper imenta l  des ign  contained 
s i x  j u r i e s  (however one c e l l  contained seven j u r i e s ) .  
Af t e r  t h e  v ideo tape  w a s  shown t h e  j u r o r s  were asked t o  d e l i b e r a t e  and 
reach a  v e r d i c t .  I f  a v e r d i c t  was no t  reached w i t h i n  25 minutes ,  t h e  sub- 
j e c t s  were informed t h a t  they  had f i v e  minutes t o  make a d e c i s i o n .  I f  a 
dec i s ion  was n o t  made i n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  t ime, t h e  j u r y  w a s  cons idered  t o  be  
"hung". Sub jec t s  were then  interviewed i n d i v i d u a l l y  by t h e  r e s e a r c h e r s .  
For purposes of t h e  p r e s e n t  d i scuss ion ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t  i n t e r v i e w  ques- 
t i o n s  were t h o s e  t h a t  asked t h e  j u r o r s  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  assessment  of t h e  
.defendant 's  g u i l t  and whether they  be l ieved  t h e  abandonment defense .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  i n t e r v i e w  contained manipulat ion checks, q u e s t i o n s  con- 
cern ing  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  p roces s  and background informat ion  on t h e  j u r o r s .  
Analysis  
This  a n a l y s i s  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  j u r i e s '  use  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e s  i n  
a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e i r  v e r d i c t s .  The f i r s t  p a r t  of t h e  a n a l y s i s  a s s e s s e s  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  importance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e s  i n  t h e  de t e rmina t ion  of t h e  ver-  
d i c t .  Next we d i s c u s s  how d i f f e r e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e s  a f f e c t  t h e  j u r i e s '  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of evidence i n  reaching  a verd ic t .By t h e i r  e f f e c t  on u s e  of evidence,  
t h e  r u l e s  should a l s o  have a n  " ind i r ec t "  e f f e c t  on t h e  outcome of t h e  v e r d i c t .  
The s t a t i s t i c a l  methods used a r e  t h e  techniques  of r e g r e s s i o n  analy-  
1 - 
sis wi th  e f fec t j  v a r i a b l e s  (Hays, 1973; Ker l inge r  & Pedhazur, 1973) : 
a n a l y s i s  of covar iance  (Ker l inger  & Pedhazur,  1973),  and an  a n a l y s i s  us ing  
l i n e a r  s t r u c t u r a l  equat ion  modeling ( ~ b ' r e s k o ~ ,  1973) . 
To provide  t h e  reader  with.  a f e e l  f o r  t h e  r e s u l t s ,  Table il p r e s e n t s  
a cont ingency t a b l e  of t h e  t h r e e  exper imenta l ly  manipulated v a r i a b l e s  by j u r y  
v e r d i c t .  The dependent v a r i a b l e  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  is  a dichotomy of g u i l t y  
11 v e r d i c t s  ve r sus  a l l  o t h e r  v e r d i c t s .  : 
E f f e c t  - of  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  Rules  on Verd ic t  -- -
Table 2 ' p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of a  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  u s ing  t h r e e  e f f e c t  
coded independent v a r i a b l e s  which r e p r e s e n t  t h e  experimental  manipdla t ions .  
The dependent v a r i a b l e  is a  seven l e v e l  v a r i a b l e  (l=unanimous g u i l t y  v e r d i c t  
and 7= unanimotis n o t  g u i l t y  v e r d i c t )  which rank o r d e r s  hung v e r d i c t s  depending 
upon t h e  r a t i o  of g u i l t y  t o  n o t  g u i l t y  v o t e s  w i t h i n  t h e  ju ry .  ~ h u s ' ,  f o r  example 
a  v e r d i c t  where' t h e  j u r y  voted f i v e  g u i l t y  and one not  g u i l t y  is  t r e a t e d  a s  a 
more g u i l t y  v e r d i c t  than a  four-two outcome. 
An examihation of t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i n  t h e  t a b l e  shows t h a t  
i n t e n t  is  most ;important i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  outcome of t h e  j u r y  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  
The i n s t r u c t i o n  v a r i a b l e  i s  a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  b u t  t h e  "s ize" of v i c t i m  
v a r i a b l e  is  no t?  s i g n i f i c a n t .  ! 
\ 
J u r i e s  under t h e  g e n e r a l  i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  f i n d  
t h e  defendant  g u i l t y .  This  fo l lows  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  judge h a s  in-  
s t r u c t e d  t h e  j u r y  t h a t  t h e  on ly  r e l e v a n t  i s s u e  i s  whether o r  n o t  t h e  defen- 
d a n t  took t h e  b r i c k s ;  and t h i s  is  f r e e l y  admit ted by a l l  t h e  wi tnes ses  i n  
t h e  test imony.  'Under t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  however, t h e  j u r y  has  
t o  dec ide  f u r t h e r  ques t ions  about  t h e  de fendan t ' s  i n t e n t i o n .  This  is 
d i spu ted  i n  t h e  t r i a l .  Given t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t  one would expect  
fewer g u i l t y  v e r d i c t s  i f  t h e  j u r i e s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  bas ing  t h e i r  v e r d i c t s  on 
the responsibility rule. This expectation is confirmed by the data. 
Similarly, when the judge informs the jury that they must follow the 
instructions that he gives them (i.e., that they must base their decision 
on a given responsibility rule) we would expect more guilty verdicts than 
when he allows the jury to decide both the law and the facts of the case. 
Again, our expectations are confirmed by the data--juries are more likely 
to find the defendant guilty under the "judge law" instruction. 
The "size" of the victim variable is not statistically significant in 
the regression equation which includes two other independent variables. , 
This result supports the hypothesis that when both relevant and irrelevant 
evidence are available, the latter type of evidence is not very important 
to juries in determining verdicts. 
These results support our contention that juries do use appropriate 
responsibility rules in deciding cases. They stand against the 
commonly presented image of juries as easily swayed by legally irrelevant 
evidence. 
Effect of Responsibility Rules on the Interpretation of Evidence: The --- - -
Is sue or~bandonment --
While the judicial instructions do have a significant impact upon jury 
verdicts, it is clear'that they do not explain a great deal of the variance 
in verdicts. In order to fully assess the effect of responsibility rules 
. on verdicts,however, it is important not only to consider the "direct" 
effect of the instructions on the verdict, but also to consider the jdries' 
interpretation of evidence under different rules. This too may have an 
effect on the verdict. Thus, the results of the preceeding analysis may 
be a conservative estimate of the use of responsibility rules in arriving 
at a verdict. , 
For instance, the jury may, given the judge's instructions, employ 
a specific intent responsibility rule but conclude that the defendant did. 
not believe the bricks were abandoned. Or, they may believe that Harris 
thought the bricks were abandoned, but think that a reasonable person would 
not have thought so; and that Harris should be held to the standard of a 
reasonable man. Recall that the last part of the judge's instructions in 
the specific intent treatment in fact proposes this latter argument to the 
juries (see p.7). In both of these situations a guilty verdict is con- 
sistent with the specific intent responsibility rule. Thus, a consideration 
of the responsibility rule alone (ignoring the jurors'interpretation of 
the evidence) would lead to the erroneous conclusion that a guilty. 
verdict in specific intent cases is "irrational1'. 
In the post-experimental interview we asked the jurors whether they 
thought that Harris believed the bricks to be abandoned (reasonable defendant) 
and whether a reasonable person would have thought that the bricks were aban- 
doned (reasonable person). Both questions were coded on a seven point scale 
from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree.(l). 
These two variables'are central to the remaining analysis. They are 
relevant in three ways. First, as suggested above, they should be relatively 
more important for juries hearing the specific intent instruction. Judicial 
instructions should specify the relationship between the reasonableness 
variables and verdict. 
/ 
Second, comparing the coefficients of these two variables should tell 
us something about the relative importance of a reasonable person standard 
versus a standard based upon Harris's belief. 
Third, if we are to argue that jury decision-making is a system based 
on responsibility rules rather than irrelevant criteria, any influence of 
the "size" of victim on jury verdicts should operate indirectly through 
variables such as these. For instance, a jury might well conclude that it 
is more reasonable to believe the abandonment argument when the bricks are 
on public land. Used in such a way the "size" of victim is not an independent 
criterion for judgement, but is being used within the context of a respon- 
sibility rule. 
a) Abandonment Under Different Rule Logics 
12 
We'hypothesize that the reasonableness variables .are.rela.tively more impor- 
tant in the specific intent treatments where the abandonment issue is cen- 
tral to a decision on Harris's guilt. In the general intent cases,al' 
though the defendant testified that he thought the bricks were abandoned,the 
instructions made this legally irrelevant. We, therefore, would expect an 
interaction effect between the reasonableness variables and the intent 
instruction. 
To test this we used .the analysis of covariance and looked for slope 
differences for the reasonableness variables on guilt between the two 
different intent instructions. Table 3 indicates that there is a significant 
slope difference for the reasonable person variable. The slopes are not 
13 ' 
significantly different for the reasonable defendant variable. 
Given this interaction we constructed two models for jury decision 
making, one for gefieral intent juries and one for specific intent juries. 
14  These are presented in Figure 1. Note that as implied by the analysis of 
covariance the coefficient describing the relationship of "reasonable 
person" to guilt is considerably larger for specific intent juries than for 
general intent juries (.667 and .314 respectively). Note further that, the 
addition of the reasonableness variables adds significantly to explained 
variance on guilt, especially for the specific intent jurors. When those 
juries are not persuaded by.the abandonment defense they are likely to 
find Harris guilty. With these models we can address the remaining hypotheses 
about the juries' use of responsibility rules. 
b) Relative Importance of Reasonableness Variables 
Examination of the coefficients of the two reasonableness variables 
on guilt indicates that the juries place relatively more importance on what' 
a reasonable  person would conclude than  upon what t h e  defendant  himself be- 
l i e v e d .  One should n o t  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  as i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  j u r o r s  neces- 
s a r i l y  d i s b e l i e v e d  H a r r i s ,  o r  t h a t  they could n o t  a p p r e c i a t e  h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  
Rather ,  i t  seems t h a t  they  focused more upon what he  should have known i n  
making t h e i r  judgement. J u r o r s  might w e l l  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Harr isythought  t h e  
b r i c k s  t o  be  abandoned, y e t  f i n h  him g u i l t y  because t o  them t h i s  appeared 
t o  be  an unreasonable b e l i e f .  I n  making t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  then ,  : the j u r i e s  
were apply ing  u n i v e r s a l i s t i c  c r i t e r i a  t o  t h e  defendant  r a t h e r  than  a s ses s ing  
h i s  c a s e  only  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c ircumstances.  This  i s  impor- 
t a n t  evidence i n  counter ing  t h e  c h a r g  t h a t  j u r o r s  base  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  on 
sympathy f o r  t h e  defendant  r a t h e r  than  us ing  s t anda rds  which apply  t o  everybody. 
c )  I n d i r e c t  E f f e c t  of Victim "Size" 
The "s ize"  of t h e  v i c t i m  does appear t o  have a n  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on 
v e r d i c t  through t h e  reasonableness  v a r i a b l e s  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  what 
a  reasonable  person should have be l ieved  concerning abandonment. Note t h a t  
t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  between v i c t i m  and t h e  reasonableness  v a r i a b l e s  i s  h ighe r  
under t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n .  Given t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s s u e s  l i k e  
v i c t i m  s i z e  become more important  a s  f a c t s  upon which j u r i e s  conclude whether 
a  b e l i e f  i n  abandonment is  reasonable .  
I n s t r u c t i o n  E f f e c t  . 
F i n a l l y ,  comparing t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  j u r y  law-judge l a w  manipulat ion 
on g u i l t ,  tt appears  t h a t  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  makes a  d i f f e r e n c e  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e  
..- 
gene ra l  i n t e n t  s i t u a t i o n .  While no t  hypothesized,  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  no t  s u r p r i -  
s i n g .  
There i s  cons ide rab le  personal  sympathy f o r  t h e  defendant  i n  t h i s  case .  
I n  i d d i t i o n  many j u r o r s  might w e l l  f e e l  t h a t  abandonment is a reasonable  
excuse. The s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n  a l lows  j u r i e s  t o  t a k e  t h e  abandon- 
ment i s s u e  , i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  i s  no t  a l a r g e  d i s -  
crepency between t h e  way i n  which t h e  j u r i e s  would l i k e  t o  dec ide  t h e  case  
and the way the judge instructs them to'decide. Under the general intent 
manlphlation, however, the judge 'is ordering the jurors to pay no attention 
to the abandonment issue and the jurors feel constrained by this instruction 
to find the defendant guilty. When the judge tells them they can determine 
the Paw as well as the facts this may relieve them from a strict interpreta- 
tion of the general intent responsibility rule and they are more likely to 
15 
find the defendant not guilty.' 
Discussion : 
.At this point in our research, the discussion must be guarded. We 
believe,'however, that we have shown that the reported results of most 
previous jury experiments are flawed by their conceptualization of the decision- 
making process. Specifically we conclude that: 
1) It'is important, especially in studying people processing insti- 
tutions, to investigate the activities leading to final products ( here, jury 
verdicts) as well as the final products themselves. The technology of such 
instituti~ns is not such that -we can know the methods of makfacture simply 
by looking at the pr0dud.t; (Littrell; 1973). 
Much of the existing jury rese-&ch has proceeded as if the technology 
were knoh or as if it were irrelevant to decision-making. O n  the contrary, 
we argue that the responsibility rule is a central technological device of 
jury deliberations. Jury studies must consider this element in order to be 
able to understand jury verdicts. 
2) Biven the central role of the technology, we have demonstrated that, 
in this experiment at least, juries are amenable to judicial instructions as 
to the proper technology (responsibility rule). 
The responsibility rules directly affect final outcomes. Moreover, they 
also affect the way in which juries interpret and draw inferences from the 
evidencein the case. Evidence, by and large, is not relevant or irrelevant 
-15- 
i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t .  Rather ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  r e l evance  and/or  p r o b i t y , o f  evidence 
is  con t ingen t  upon t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  be ing  used. Viewed from t h i s  per- 
s p e c t i v e ,  j'ury d e c i s i o n s  appear l e s s  i r r a t i o n a l  thay  they  do when respon- 
s i b i l i t y  r u l e s  a r e  l e f t  unexamined. 
Conclusion 
I n  conclus ion ,  we might add t h a t  i t  has  n o t  been our  purpose o r  ex- 
p e c t a t i o n  t o  show t h a t  j u r i e s  a r e  i n  f a c t  pursu ing  some a b s o l u t e l y  
fo rma l - r a t iona l  i d e a l  type  of system i n  a r r i v i n g  a t  v e r d i c t s  (Weber, 1967) .  
C l e a r l y  a good d e a l  of s u b s t a n t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y  is  involved i n  j u r y  d e c i s i o n s .  
I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  i s  one of t h e  primary j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t r i a l  by jury .  The 
system, however, is  r a t i o n a l  and p r i n c i p l e d .  
. , 
TABLE 1: INTENT, INSTRUCTION & VICTIM BY VERDICT (N=49) 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  General  I n t e n t  
J u r y  Law Judge Law J u r y  Law Judge Law 
C o e f f i c i e n t  Standard Er ro r  P 
t I 
S t a t e  Jnd iv idua l  S t a t e  I n d i v i d u a l  ,State, I n d i v i d u a l  S t a t e  I n d i v i d u a l  
specif ic=-  1 ,hLi7 1 .  . a52  INTENT General  =-1 
CONSTANT 
G u i l t y  .? 
oL I 
Not Gu i l ty  
o r  Hung 
TABLE 3: TEST OF SLOPE DIFFERENCES OF REASONABLENESS VARIABLES ON 
GUILT BY INTENT CONDITION (DF=1,45) 
General  I n t e n t  S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  F  P 










I ,  71 
'-1 
3 ,  
a This  v a r i a b l e  i s  measured a s  fo l lows:  A reasonable  person would have 
thought  t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  were abandoned. ( l=ve ry  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e -  
ment is  no t  t r u e  ... 4=uncer ta in  ... 7=very c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t emen t  
is  t r u e ) .  
b  The defendant  r e a l l y  thought t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  were abandoned. 
(same s c a l e  a s  above) .  
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FIGURE 1: MODEL OF JURY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
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* There is no satisfactory discussion in the literature about the probability 
level necessary to conclude that an adequate "fit" of the hypothesized model 
has been attained. However, the p-values reported here are, we believe, 
sufficiently close to 1.0 to warrant accepting the model. 
APPENDIX A 
A Methodological Note on Aggregation - -- 
Throughout t h i s  a n a l y s i s  we have used t h e  j u r y  a s  our  u n i t  of a n a l y s i s .  
There i s  cons ide rab le  cont roversy  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  a s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
such aggrega t ion  on expla ined  va r i ance  and c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  -(Hanmn 
1971; Hannan& Burs t e in ,  1974; Grunfeld & G r i l i c h e s ,  1960). 
We b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n a l y s i s  i s  a t  t h e  j u r y  
l e v e l .  We a r e  i n  f a c t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  j u r y  v e r d i c t s .  We wish t o  know what 
i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  s i x  persongroups which d e l i b e r a t e  t oge the r .  To u s e  an  in-  
d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  a n a l y s i s  when t h e  conceptua l  focus  i s  on t h e  j u r y  is t o  c r e a t e  
a  d i s saggrega t ion  b i a s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  aggregated d a t a  produces g r e a t e r  
( 
explained va r i ance  than  i n d i v i d u a l  l e i e l  d a t a .  We p r e f e r  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  
l a r g e r  expla ined  v a r i a n c e  as t h e  t r u e r  e s t ima te .  The j u r y  level d a t a  l e a d s  
t o  h igher  expla ined  v a r i a n c e  because i t  e l i m i n a t e s  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e  in t roduced  
by t h e  d e v i a t i o n  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  j u r o r  from t h e  j u r y  mean. 
We have i n  f a c t  examined t h e  d a t a  a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  j u r o r  
i 
and t h e  expla ined  vakiance  i s  cons iderably  lower.  The only  s i g n i f i c a n t  
change i n  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i s  t h a t  defendant  reasonableness  
is  r e l a t i v e l y  more impor tan t  a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l ,  and t h e r e  is a  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t  between i n t e n t  and t h i s  v a r i a b l e .    here is  
cons ide rab le  cont roversy  as t o  whether d i f f e r e n c e s  such as t h e s e  can bea r  any 
s u b s t a n t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  o r  whether they  a r e  due t o  s t a t i s t i c a l  a r t i f a c t s  
16  in t roduced  by t h e  d i saggrega t ion  process .  
Never the less ,  our  main s u b s t a n t i v e  conclus ions  about  t h e  importance 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e s  i n  j u r y  decision-making a r e  no t  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  
l e v e l  of a n a l y s i s .  
APPENDIX B 
Correlation Matrices used in Analysis -- 
I. All Juries (N=49) 
INTENT INSTRUCTION VICTIM VERDICT 
INTENT 1.0 
INSTRUCTION -.020 1.0 
VICTIM ,020 -.020 
VERDICT .335 ,283 
11. Specific Intent Juries (N=24) (below diagonal) 
General Intent Juries (N=25) (above diagonal) 
REASONABLE REASONABLE VERDICT INSTRUCTION VICTIM 
PERSON DEFENDANT 





DEFENDANT .679 1.0 . .283 -.I30 
(JURY MEAN) 
VERDICT 




1. I n  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  of t h e  Republic,  t h i s  i n  f a c t  was t h e  accepted norm. 
J u r i e s  were considered "judges both of t h e  law and t h e  f a c t s  i n  a  c r i m i n a l  c a s e  
and were no t  t o  be bound by t h e  opinion of t h e  cour t . "  (Baldwin, J ,  i n  
U.S. v .  Wilson, Federa l  Case N a  16 ,  730 C.C.E.D. Pa. (1830). Not u n t i l  
1895 i n  Sparf v .  United S t a t e s ,  156 U.S.51 (1895) d i d  t h e  Supreme Court 
hold t h a t  t h e  judge and n o t  t h e  j u r y  was t h e  dec ide r  of t h e  law. See, Howe, 
" ~ u r i e s  a s  Judges of Criminal  Law," 52 Harvard Law Review 582 (1939). 
2. I n  another  paper ,  "From Laboratory t o  Juryroom: A Review of Experiments 
on J u r y  ~ec is ion-Making"  ( i n  p rog res s ) ,  w e  d i s c u s s  t h e  methodological problems 
of t h e s e  experiments.  
3. This  percentage  does no t  inc lude  t h e  5.5% of t h e  cases-where  t h e  j u r y  hung. 
Of t h e  19.1% repor t ed  i n  t h e  ' t e x t ,  16.9% were c a s e s  where t h e  j u r y  acqui t ted,  
and t h e  judge would have found g u i l t y .  I n  only 2.2% of t h e  c a s e s  d i d  t h e  
jur?  f i n d  t h e  defendant  g u i l t y  where t h e  judge would have acqu i t t ed .  (Kalven 
and Z e i s e l  1966: 55-59). Thus, i t  appears  t h a t  i n  c r i m i n a l  ca ses ,  j u r i e s  
a r e  more l e n i e n t  than  judges. 
4. This  view of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has  a  t r a d i t i o n  i n  soc io logy  a s  we l l  as 
law. The Sykes and Matza (1957) theory  about  techniques  of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  
concerns t h e  d i f f e r e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  of excuses by de l inquen t s  and t h e  j u v e n i l e  
c o u r t .  S c o t t  & Lyman's d i scuss ion  of accounts  a l s o  approaches r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
from t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  (1968). Goffman e x h i b i t s  a  s i m i l a r  approach i n  
h i s  concept of "remedial work" which is  designed t o  t ransform "what could be  
seen  a s  o f f e n s i v e  i n t o  what can be seen a s  acceptab le ."  (1971:109) (For a 
r e c e n t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  s tudy  along t h e s e  l i n e s ,  s e e  Blumstein, et .  a l ,  1974: 
551),  
None of t h e s e  s t u d i e s m a k e s p r e c i s e l y  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  we a r e  making 
between t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r u l e  and t h e  evidence used t o  judge i t ,  a l though 
S c o t t  and Lyman come c l o s e  wi th  t h e i r  concept  of i l l e g i t i m a t e  account.  
(1968 : 55) .- 
5. I n  t h e  Kaplan and Kemrnerick s tudy  t h e  j u r o r s  w e r e  provjded wi th  two 
independent v a r i a b l e s .  One ( t h e  de fendan t ' s  d r i v i n g  behavior  a t  t h e  t i m e  
of an  a c c i d e n t ) ,  was c l e a r l y  more p roba t ive  than  t h e  o t h e r  (defendant ' s  
personal  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) .  While t h e  a u t h o r s  do no t  p re sen t  any a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  amount of v a r i a n c e  explained by t h e  two v a r i a b l e s ,  an 
examination of t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  a r t i c l e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
evidence played a r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e r  r o l e  i n  t h e  j u r o r s '  dec ison .  (1974; 
496). 
6.  "The c o u r t  thought  t h e  only  ques t ion  was, Did he  in t end  t o  t a k e  t h e  
proper ty?  That t h e  removal of them was a consc ious  and i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t  
was admit ted.  But t h a t  i s o l a t e d  f a c t  i s  n o t  an adequate  b a s i s  on which 
t h e  j u r y  should f i n d  t h e  c r imina l  i n t e n t  t o  s t e a l  o r  knowingly conve r t ,  t h a t  
is, w r o n g f u l b t o  d e p r i v e  another  of possess ion  of proper ty .  Whether t h a t  in-  
t e n t  e x i s t e d ,  t h e  j u r y  must determine,  n o t  on ly  from t h e  a c t  of t ak ing ,  b u t  
from t h a t  t oge the r  w i th  de fendan t ' s  tes t imony and a l l  of t h e  surrounding 
circumstances.  
I n  course ,  t h e  j u r y ,  cons ider ing  M o r i s s e t t e ' s  awareness t h a t  t h e s e  
cas ings  were on government proper ty ,  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  s eek  any permission 
f o r  t h e i r  removal and h i s  s e l f - . i n t e r e s t  as a w i tnes s ,  might have d i s -  
be l ieved  h i s  p ro fe s s ion  of innocent  i n t e n t  and concluded t h a t  h i s  a s s e r t i o n  
of a b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  c a s i n g s  were abandoned was a n  a f t e r t h o u g h t .  Had t h e  
jury convicted on the proper instructions it would be the end of the matter. 
But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges. They 
might have concluded that the heaps of spent casings left in the hinter- 
-land to rust away presented an appearance of unwanted and abandoned junk, 
and that lack of any conscious deprivation of property or intentional injury 
was indicated by Morisette's good character, the openness of the taking, 
crushing and transporting of the casings, and the candor with which it was 
all admitted. They might have refused to brand Morissette as a thief. Had 
they done so, that too would have been the end of the matter." 342 U.S. 246, 
276 (1952). 
7. The manipulations were embedded in thebody of the instructions. We 
attempted to make them no more obtrusive than they would be in a real trial. 
Thus, out of something over 7 minutes of instructions, the manipulations 
accounted for only 30 to 45 seconds. 
8. These instructions are those now given to federal juries in light of 
Mori'ssette. 
9. Although comparable data was not available for the population of jurors in 
Washtenaw County, an examination of the distributions of our sample of jurors 
on certain demographic variables seemed to indicate that our sample was not 
seriously biased. 46.6% of the jurors were male and 53.4% female. Blacks 
were somewhat underrepresented (94.3% white, 5% black and .7% another race). 
As would be .anticipated in a county containing two large universities, pro- 
fessionals and students were overrepresented. (31.8% professional and 
technical workers and 12.4% students) and the education and income distri- 
butions were more to the high end of the scales than is true for the popu- 
lation in general ( median income was about $20,000 and median education 
was just over three years of college, with almost one quarter of the sample 
having somegraduate training). The mean age of the sample was 39 years. 
Censrsdaea for the city of Ann Arbor in 1970 shows the population was 
91% white and the median years of schooling was reported to be 1'5.4. Also 
the largest proportion of workers was in the category of professional and 
technical workers. 
Even though our sample seems to be representative of the Ann Arbor popu- 
lation, one might challenge our conclusions by arguing that the popuJation 
of Ann Arbor is not representative of the general population. In order to 
test the hypothesis that the over-representation of well-educated jurors 
in Washtenaw County accounts for our findingof more juror rationality than 
was previously thought to exist, we divided our sample into those with a high- 
school educa'tion or less and those with more than a high school education. 
As one might expect, the subjects with lower educational attainment were 
slightly more conviction prone. But in other respects discussed in this 
paper there (were no significant differences between the two groups. 
10. While eight subjects were alwais scheduled, we found it to be extremely 
difficult to always get at least six jurors to come. We, therefore decided to 
run the experiment with five person juries when necessary. . A  comparision of 
five and six person juries indicates that there are differences in their 
- verdicts. The primary difference is that, as one might expect, five person 
juries were more likely to reach a unanimous verdict than were s'ix person 
juries (82% vs. 49%). 
Other differences, however, lead us to conclude that the use of the smaller 
juries does not affect our findings. In all cases where there are differences, 
I 
t h e  f i v e  person j u r i e s  a r e  ope ra t i ng  a g a i n s t  our  hypotheses .  Moreover, t h e  
main e £ f e c t s  i n  t h e  experiment remain s i g n i f i c a n t  when w e  look  only  a t  , . .,. . '4 
s i x  person j u r i e s .  Given t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  w e  w i l l  t r e a t  a l l  j u r i e s  a s  a  s i n g l e  
d a t a  s e t .  
11. The v e r d i c t s  of t h e  49 j u r i e s  produced a skewed d i s t r i b u t i o n  toward 
g u i l t y  v e r d i c t s  wi th  a  l a r g e  percentage  of hung j u r i e s .  Twenty-six j u r i e s  
found t h e  defendant  g u i l t y ,  n ine t een  j u r i e s  hung and only  f o u r  found t h e  
defendant  n o t  g u i l t y .  
The pe rcen t  of hung j u r i e s  i s  l a r g e l y  an a r t i f a c t  of  t h e  s h o r t  t i m e  we 
allowed j u r i e s  t o  d e l i b e r a t e .  A longer  d e l i b e r a t i o n  t i m e  might have re- 
duced t h e  percentage  of hung j u r i e s .  
Dichotomizing t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e  between g u i l t y  and a l l  o t h e r  
v e r d i c t s  produces n e a r l y  an  even s p l i t  on t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e  (26 vs. 23). 
Conceptual ly ,  w e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  t o  combine hung j u r i e s  w i t h  t h o s e  
who r e tu rned  v e r d i c t s  of  n o t  g u i l t y  s i n c e  a  hung v e r d i c t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  S t a t e  could no t  convince s i x  people t h a t  t h e  defendant  was g u i l t y .  A l -  
thoqgh t h e  S t a t e  can of cou r se  r e t r y  such ca se s ,  t h i s  i s  o f t e n  n o t  done and 
t h e  defendant  is r e l e a s e d .  
12. For purposes  of t h i s  and 'subsequent a n a l y s i s ,  we c r e a t e d  reasonableness  
v a r i a b l e s  f o r  j u r i e s  by agg rega t ing  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  j u r o r  s c o r e s .  The aggre- 
ga ted  v a r i a b l e  i s  t h e  mean s c o r e  f o r  j u r i e s  on t h e s e  two v a r i a b l e s .  See 
t h e  methodological  n o t e  i n  Appendix A f o r  a  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  of u se  of 
aggrega t ion  i n  ana lyz ing  t h e  d a t a .  
13. Although t h e  hypo thes i s  must be r e j e c t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  reasonable  
defendant  v a r i a b l e ,  t h i s  must be  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  l i g h t  of i t s  r e l a t i v e  unim- 
por tance  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  j u r y  v e r d i c t s  ( s e e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  b.  below). 
14.  The models were e s t ima ted  us ing  t h e  l i n e a r  s t r u c t u r a l  equa t ion  system 
developed by Kar l  JSreskog.  Th i s  system a l lows  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  t o  s o l v e  a 
s e r i e s  of s imultaneous equa t ions  r e p r e s e n t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among t h e  in-  
dependent and dependent v a r i a b l e s .  This  produces s t anda rd i zed  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
which a r e  analogous t o  t h o s e  produced by a  p a t h  a n a l y s i s  program. I n  addi-  
t i o n ,  J&eskog l s  method w i l l  produce a  chi-square t e s t  of how c l o s e l y  t h e  
s p e c i f i e d  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  approximate t h e  t o t a l  set of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  conta ined  
i n  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  ma t r ix .  
A f u r t h e r  advantage of t h e  J;reskog program is  t h a t  i t  a l l ows  one 
t o  assume t h a t  t h e  d i s t u r b a n c e  terms of t h e  independent v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
c o r r e l a t e d .  Th i s  was important  f o r  us  because t h e  two reasonableness  
v a r i a b l e s  have c o r r e l a t e d  d i s t u r b a n c e  terms. Th i s  c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  shown i n  
t h e  models. I n  f a c t  we a l s o  d i d  t h e  a n a l y s i s  u s ing  o rd ina ry  l e a s t  squa re s  
e s t i m a t e s  and t h e  consequences f o r  t h e  pa th  c o e f f i c i e n t s  was s l i g h t .  
15.  I n  t h e  i n t e rv i ew  w e  asked t h e  s u b j e c t s  about  t h e  du ty  of j u r o r s  t o  
obey j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  Seventy-seven pe rcen t  of t h e  j u r o r s  who re- 
ceived t h e  "judge law" i n s t r u c t i o n  s a i d  t h e  j u r o r  must obey t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n ;  
e igh t een  pe rcen t  s a i d  t h e  j u r o r  should obey u n l e s s  some s p e c i a l  c i rcumstance 
a r i s e s ;  and only  f i v e  pe rcen t  s a i d  j u r o r s  should no t  fo l l ow  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  
1)ut should do j u s t i c e  between t h e  p a r t i e s .  For j u r o r s  who heard t h e  " ju ry  
law" i n s t r u c t i o n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  percentages  were 59%, 27% and 14%. A ch i -  
square  t e s t  i n d i c a t e s  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  be  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .004 level 
(N=274). 
16 .  This  problem i s  e s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  where, a s  h e r e ,  grouping i s  by va lues  
of a  v a r i a b l e  no t  e x p l i c i t l y  included i n  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  model. For a  d i s -  
cus s ion  s e e  Hannan & B u r s t e i n ,  1974:374). 
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